The European Monetary System (EMS) has now been in operation for about one year. Dr. Burgard explains the main elements of the system and the problems still awaiting solution.
T here are some people who do not acknowledge the systemic character of the "European Monetary System" (EMS). Nevertheless, even if a number of issues remain unsettled as will be shown in the following analysis, it should be possible to find common ground as to how the EMS should be classified. Idealising a little, it could be baptised as a dual currency exchange rate union of the harmonisation type with an adjustment trigger and the use by EEC central banks of a genuine common reserve asset. As we shall see, this definition is not complete and overstates some issues.
Effective first steps toward monetary unification may clearly be detected since beginnings of [] a central authority in the monetary field [] a common instrument of settlement [] an adjustment trigger and a set of harmonisation rules * Head of the Division for Monetary Relations, EC-Commission. -Together with Professor Andr6 Four~ans, the author of this article has conducted the "Alpbach Banking Seminar on the EMS" organised by the "Austrian College" from 19 to 26 August 1979. The text is an amended version of the oral report Dr. Burgard gave on 27 August to the "Europ~iisches Forum Alpbach". Opinions expressed are personal and the European Commission's views are not involved, nor those of Professor Fourqans or the participants of the Seminar. Given the review-character of this text, more than 50 footnotes would be necessary to indicate sources. As printing space is limited and in order not to discriminate, no references are presented.
[] an organisation of resource transfers and [] a better harmonisation of monetary policy vis-&-vis the outside are evident.
Central Monetary Authority
The "European Monetary Cooperation Fund" (EMCF), has got a new unit of account. This unit is of the "fixed amount basket type". It creates a network of financial solidarity between "member central banks". Under the former unit of account, creditor central banks, in the end, benefitted for all credits granted in the Fund context from an exchange guarantee in their own currency. The debtor central banks had to shoulder the whole exchange risk. Now the creditor central banks get a guarantee in ECU terms. On historical experience, this is a better guarantee than the usual dollar risk they run on the bulk of their national monetary reserves.
By Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3180/78, this Fund has seen a widening of its banking rules and got a certain issuing right concerning ECUs. Part of the banking rules are common valuing prescriptions for gold and dollars, applicable to a fraction of "member central banks'" official reserves. Inversely, there exist minimum reserve requirements scheduled upon certain kinds of "member banks' " assets.
The EMCF is to be transformed into a European Monetary Fund (EMF). As far as the issuing right might be enlarged in the EMF, via reformulated credit facilities, a controversy arose in the economic literature about the "moral hazard" of an interest policy not based on market-related decisions by the EMF but on an averaging rule as is presently applied to the interest being paid on ECU debts. The problems arising from the question of what the interest rate on SDRs should be, seem to some people to be a good (or bad) experience. Furthermore, there are arguments for and against a role of the EMF as financial intermediary (comparable to the International Monetary Fund) versus enhancing the central monetary authorities' qualities. If there were to be credit tranches as a certain interpretation of the Bremen Annex (para. 2) suggests, the question arises as to which institution will fix the terms of economic and monetary conditiona!ity.,The possibility was mentioned that higher credit-.t.ranches could bear higher interest rates.
One of the most important issues concerning the future EMF is its institutional position vis-a-vis the "member central banks" and the Council. At present, the Board of Governors of the Fund -following Art. 3 of its Statutes -is bound to "act in accordance with the general economic policy guidelines drawn up under the Treaty by the Council and in accordance with such directives as the Council may adopt acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission".
Beginnings of a Common Currency
Without any doubt, the ECU is for "member central banks" not only a unit of account and a store of value, but also a means of payments and of settlement. However, for some of these functions, the use of the ECU is still rather precarious, being based on a rollover of three-month swaps, or conditioned by an acceptance limit. Nevertheless, following the Brussels Resolution, the ECU "will be at the centre of the EMS" (para. 2.1). Does this mean that the aforementioned precariousness is to be eliminated? Will the ECU be a fully-fledged money reserved for the use of "member central banks"?
Given the fact that the currency basket of the ECU is the "numeraire" for the national monies of the adhering "member banks", the ECU is not the embryo of a flexible rate parallel currency; rather "member banks" could, in accordance with theory, be regarded as parts of a kind of dual currency two-tier central bank system. In contrast to what theory has imagined, the second stage of this system is not an emanation of the first stage, but rather the inverse.
Even if formally we are faced with a dual currency system, sceptics will question whether there will not be for most "member banks" in reality a triangular system comprising the ECU, the respective national currency and the strongest EMS currency. The characteristics and the strength or weakness of the ECU are a product of its components and of the rules established for its use. As a weighted average of its components, the ECU can only compete with the strongest EMS currency insofar as the rules applied to its use give it a competitive capacity. So, what future the ECU will have in comparison with EMS currencies and, particularly, the strongest one depends not only on comparative national stabilisation policies but also on Community legislation.
From a technical point of view, there exists a remedy. We may remember that the "snake" had two kinds of experiences as to necessary central rate changes. There were cases when a currency adjusted its bilateral central rates equiproportionally vis-a-vis all other participating currencies. In other cases, there was some differentiation. In all cases of central rate adjustments practised in the "snake", however, no common denominator had to be concomitantly adopted. Now, due to the complexities of the ECU as "numeraire" a variety of options are theoretically open. One policy stance is to look only at the adjustment of bilateral central rates, simply accepting the arithmetic consequences on the ECU rates of all participating currencies. This was the case when central rates were adopted in the EMS on September 24 and November 30, 1979. Another policy stance could be to introduce a supplementary arithmetic rule guaranteeing after each adjustment both the expected bilateral central rate changes and stability in value with the strongest EMS currency. To resume this point: the systemtechnically seen -has the capacity with the same adjustment of bilateral central rates, to hold the ECU at least as strong as the strongest EMS currency.
If it were decided to hold the ECU in central rate terms steady vis-a-vis the strongest EMS currency, then there would no longer be a risk of a triangular currency system. Besides, the market would get, by a Council Regulation, a strong incentive to deal in market-created ECU-denominated assets.
The monetary rule for the issuing of ECUs has been, until now, a mechanical one. ECUs are to be created or
